A. Preliminary Factual Contentions
1. Complete
Fictionalization of Events
Although
Defendants’ Motion studiously avoids addressing any of the factual allegations
stated in the pleadings; nonetheless, they manage to admit to a state-created
danger, and a “special relationship” with the Firm in performance of a “public
function” which is “required by statute,” and the attendant assumption of
liability under Monell; as well as taking
great pains to establish that Bealmear acted as a private citizen, i.e. a
“volunteer,” and her liability as such in acts of extortion under color of
official right pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1951, violent crime in aid of
racketeering pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1959, conspiracy to launder money pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and various other racketeering predicate acts.
a. Defendants’
Motion Refers to No Facts Stated in the Pleadings
The
Statement of Facts in Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 46, I.) is a complete
fictionalization, bearing not even a slight resemblance to reality. Further, no documentation is attached to
support the assertions made. These
unfounded assertions fail to refute the facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s
verified Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) (“Complaint”).
b. Facts
Regarding the Orders of Protection
Among the numerous verifiable falsehoods stated in
Defendants’ Motion is that:
Salois… applied for and
was granted two orders of protection against Plaintiff in St. Louis County,
Missouri from 2009-2010.
Doc.
46, I. The majority of the order of
protection activity was in St. Louis County; but there was only one granted to
Salois, and the extension of it was denied.
A full accounting of each and every order of
protection in chronological order here follows, each entered in St. Louis
County, Missouri except where otherwise noted:
1.
Hart
v. Jinkerson, Cause no. 09SL-PN02411, on June 9,
2009; dismissed without prejudice on June 22, 2009;
2.
Salois
v. Hart, Cause no. 09SL-PN02974, on July 13, 2009; ex parte
extended on July 30, 2009; directed to Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office for
service on August 5, 2009; full order entered under duress following battery of
Plaintiff on August 27, 2009; extension requested and denied on July 13, 2010;
expired on August 26, 2010;
3.
Straussner
v. Hart, Cause no. 09SL-PN03697, on August 27, 2009;
directed to Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office for service on August 27, 2009;
full order entered on September 10, 2009; expired on September 9, 2010;
4.
Hart
v. Salois, Cause no. 09SL-PN03699, on August 27, 2009; full
order entered on September 10, 2009; extended through November 4, 2010;
5.
Hart
v. Straussner, Cause no. 09SL-PN03700, on August 27,
2009; full order entered on September 10, 2009; rehearing and dismissal on
November 23, 2009;
6.
Milwaukee County, Wisconsin Harassment
Restraining Order Hart v. Howard, Case No.
2009CV013711; ex parte denied August 31, 2009; Scott County, Missouri Sheriff’s
Office unable to effect service; case dismissed;
7.
Hart
v. Salois, Cause no. 10SL-PN04549, on November 4, 2010;
dismissed without prejudice by petitioner on November 18, 2010;
8.
Platte County, Missouri order Hart v. Salois, Cause no. 10AE-CV04180, on
November 18, 2010; full order entered on November 30, 2010; extended through
December 20, 2011; extension denied.
Defendants’ Motion states:
Salois received Orders
of Protection against Plaintiff in both Wisconsin and Missouri state courts.
Doc.
46, I, n. p.3. Defendants’ Motion cites
the Amended Complaint pp. 48-53, which states nothing of Salois’ acts; but rather
the lawful subject matter jurisdiction for issuance of orders of protection and
emergency orders in the States of Missouri and Wisconsin. Rather, Salois’ relevant acts are described
under the heading “The Original Petition” beginning at Compl. p. 57. To Plaintiff’s knowledge, Salois entered into
the State of Wisconsin only once as a small child.
The only relevant action in the circuit courts of
the State of Wisconsin was the harassment civil injunction petition which
Plaintiff filed against Defendant Douglas Howard. This action was dismissed after the Scott
County, Missouri Sheriff’s Office was unable to effect service on Defendant
Howard, in many ways the quintessential meth addict, with a reputation for
irritability and violence, and having an awful lot of spent shotgun shells
littering his driveway. It was the
service of process in relation to this proceeding which:
Defendant Shirley Hopper inadvertently boasted of
Defendant Howard’s capacity to evade service in her correspondence to the court
in relation to the Platte County Order .
Compl. ¶541.
c. Defendants’
Statement of Facts fail to state a valid legal defense
Defendants’ Statement of Facts, even if taken as true,
fails to state a valid legal defense; instead stating that it is the official
policy, custom, practice, and procedure that certain persons, of which class
Plaintiff was a member, should properly be subjected to felony crimes,
including but not limited to crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16,
solely on the basis of perceived thought, feeling, opinion, and belief.
2. Defendants’
Motion a Press Release for the Firm
That the County has no concern for representing the
interests of the Officers in favor of protecting their free source of labor in
the Firm is readily apparent, in that Defendants’ Motion reads very much like a
press release for the Firm.
Defendants’ Motion, rather than addressing the
allegations of fact stated in the Complaint, certifies that the following is
true and correct after a reasonable inquiry, and may be supported by admissible
evidence, although no manner of documentation is submitted in support:
1.
“[T]he present action was commenced in
bad faith”;
2.
“[T]he present action… is alarming
evidence of a pattern of pathological conduct”;
3.
“[T]he sole motive [of the instant
matter] [is] to assert power and control over Defendant Sherry Ann Salois”;
4.
“Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is
nothing more than a … retaliatory instrument against Defendant Sherry Ann
Salois”;
5.
That “[Plaintiff] continues to
perpetuate” “domestic conflict” “through the present action.”
That these characterizations are not substantiated
by documentation, but rather this Court is asked to assume the truth of all
factual allegations stated in the Complaint, drawing reasonable inferences therefrom,
the following deconstruction provides more clarity as to what these assertions
actually entail:
1.
Any person the victim of fraud or
violent crime, being deprived of rights secured by the United States
Constitution and its laws, who might seek redress or vindication must
necessarily act “in bad faith”;
2.
To seek vindication of rights or redress
of grievances in a federal court constitutes “evidence of a pattern of
pathological conduct”;
3.
That for any person to seek vindication
of rights or redress of grievances in a federal court amounts to “pathological conduct”
to “assert power and control” over parties culpable by law;
4.
That for any person to seek vindication
of rights or redress of grievances in a federal court is merely “retaliatory”;
5.
That “power and control over Defendant
Sherry Ann Salois” is somehow desired by Plaintiff for no apparent reason, and the
instant matter has been reasonably determined to constitute effective means;
6.
That schemes of bankruptcy fraud, identity
fraud, extortion, wire fraud, and deprivation of civil rights amount to a
“domestic conflict” under the laws of the United States;
7.
That Plaintiff initiated and “continues
to perpetuate” schemes of bankruptcy fraud, identity fraud, extortion, wire fraud,
and deprivation of civil rights upon himself;
8.
That, while “presenting to the court a…
written motion” such a paper as Defendant’s Motion, “with the apparent purpose,
or at least the effect, of harassment, not only of [the] opposing part[y] but
of the judicial machinery itself[,]… barely discernible,… replete with conclusory
and self-serving allegations… contain[ing] numerous frivolous claims under a
nonsensical laundry list of authorities” that to respond to the allegations of fact
stated in the Complaint in such a manner is “after an inquiry reasonable” is “certifie[d]
that”: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose… ; (2) the
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law… ; (3)
the factual contentions have evidentiary support… ; and (4) the denials of
factual contentions are warranted on the evidence[.] Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b); Doc. 41, I. ¶1.
Defendants’ Motion cites no supporting law favoring these
assertions.
3. Crimes
of Violence pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 16 which
Defendants
State Any Person Is Rightfully Subjected to
on
the Sole Basis of Thought, Feeling, Opinion, or Belief
In perfect keeping with the long and checkered
history of the Ku Klux Klan in St. Louis County, Missouri, Defendants’ Motion
states unequivocally that it is the official policy, custom, practice, and
procedure of Defendant St. Louis County that Plaintiff be subjected to felony
crimes, including but not limited to crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
16, solely on the basis of his perceived thoughts, feelings, opinions, and
beliefs; without regard to the veracity of such perception.
For present considerations, it is unimportant as to
whether these Defendants are actually officially affiliated with the Ku Klux
Klan, or merely that the attitudes, traditions, and customs of that
organization are so deeply embedded within the culture of that place that these
Defendants’ goals and aims have evolved wholly independently along parallel
lines so as to arrive at precisely the same ends. Nonetheless, the fact that the Ku Klux Klan
remains active in St. Louis County, Missouri offers important insight and guidance
on this point.
A partial listing of the
felony crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16 which
Defendants state that Plaintiff, among other persons, is properly subjected to
on the sole basis of thought, feeling, opinion, and belief is here attached as
Exhibit 6. Exh. 6.