/* The Malfeasance of St. Louis County */

Saturday, November 30, 2013

Of Marc J. Zwillinger and Bart Huff

Plaintiffs move to compel documents from non-party Yahoo, Inc. (“Yahoo!”). On January 15, 2007, Plaintiffs served two subpoenas at the Chicago office of Yahoo!. The subpoenas seek records of the identities of members of two Yahoo! Groups (“APDUG” and “BREEDMATE”) as well as the contents of messages posted to these particular groups. Yahoo! objects to the subpoenas on three grounds: (1) the subpoenas were not issued by the proper court because Yahoo! is a California resident and the records sought are located in California and not stored nor accessible in Illinois; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) prohibits Yahoo! from disclosing the contents of subscriber communications in response to a civil subpoena; and (3) the scope of information sought by the subpoena posed an undue burden on Yahoo! as a non-party to the litigation.This Order addresses the first issue of whether the subpoenas were issued by the proper court.

Yahoo!’s corporate headquarters is located in Sunnyvale, California. In Sunnyvale and nearby Santa Clara, Yahoo! employs nearly five thousand people. Data from Yahoo! Groups, as well as subscriber information and records, is maintained and stored on Yahoo!’s servers in California. Yahoo’s Compliance Department, also based in Sunnyvale, is responsible for responding to subpoenas seeking such data. In order to obtain documents responsive to subpoenas, members of Yahoo!’s Compliance Department use specially designed software applications (“Legal Tools”) to help locate, retrieve, preserve, and produce documents related to user activities and user content. Access to records regarding Yahoo! users and to content of user communications is strictly limited to the members of the Compliance Department and other employees whose job functions require such access.

Yahoo! also has a Chicago office. Yahoo! has no other offices in Illinois. There are 51 employees in Yahoo!’s Chicago office. Yahoo!’s Chicago office is a sales office for Yahoo! and for Yahoo! properties such as Yahoo! Search Marketing,which allows business customers to appear in sponsored listings, and Yahoo! HotJobs, a service that helps match potential employers with jobseekers. None of the employees in Yahoo!’s Chicago office have access to Legal Tools or systems housing the underlying user data. Yahoo!’s Chicago office stores no user records or content for Yahoo! Groups. No Chicago-based employees have access to the types of user account information or user communications requested by the subpoenas in this case. Data from Yahoo! Groups, as well as subscriber information and records, is maintained and stored on Yahoo’s servers in California.

Plaintiffs and Yahoo! agree that the two-part test set forth in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F.Supp. 1138, 1144 (N.D. Ill. 1979), controls the question of whether Yahoo! can be compelled to produce documents stored and accessible in the Northern District of California in this judicial district. The In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation court held that a court has the power to order a person subject to its jurisdiction to perform an act in another state, such as the production of documents located elsewhere, if two preconditions are met: (1) the court must have personal jurisdiction over the person subpoenaed and (2) the subpoena recipient must have control over the documents. 480 F.Supp. at 1144. “The location of the documents is irrelevant.” Id. Yahoo! does not dispute that it is subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois and therefore, meets the first criteria. As to the issue of control, Yahoo! says its Chicago office does not have control over the documents because no employee in that office has the ability to access the subpoenaed information. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs the issuance of subpoenas. Rule 45(a)(2)(C) directs that a subpoena for production and inspection, if separate from a subpoena commanding a person’s attendance, must issue “from the court for the district where the production or inspection is to be made.” “Paragraph (a)(2) makes clear that the person subject to the subpoena is required to produce materials in that person’s control whether or not the materials are located within the district or within the territory within which the subpoena can be served.” Advisory Committee Notes on 1991 Amendment to Rule 45. Therefore, “‘[p]roduction’ refers to the delivery of documents, not their retrieval, and therefore ‘the district in which the production . . . is to be made’ is not the district in which the documents are housed but the district in which the subpoenaed party is required to turn them over.” Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 412 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.); see also In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation, 229 F.R.D. 482, 494-95 (E.D. Pa. 2005). Although Yahoo! is a California resident and the records sought are located and accessible in California, the subpoenas direct Yahoo! to produce documents in La Grange, Illinois, located in the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs’ subpoenas therefore comply with Rule 45(a)(2).

Yahoo! claims that its Chicago office has no control over the documents sought. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1991 Amendment to Rule 45 says that “[a] non-party witness is subject to the same scope of discovery under this rule as that person would be as a party to whom the request is addressed pursuant to Rule 34.” Rule 34 requires production of documents within the “possession, custody, or control” of the party served. Documents are in the “possession, custody, or control” of the served party if “the party has actual possession, custody, or control, or has the legal right to obtain the documents on demand.” In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1995).

Yahoo!’s attempt to deny control is unavailing. Yahoo! has actual physical possession of the requested documents since they are Yahoo!’s own documents. This is not a case where a separate legal entity such as a subsidiary or non-party has possession of the documents. Yahoo!’s Chicago office and corporate headquarters are not separate and distinct entities. Yahoo! is a single entity, and the information is available from the corporation itself. The relationship here is one between different offices of the same entity. Because Yahoo!’s Chicago office is part of the same entity as Yahoo!’s corporate headquarters, the subpoenaed documents are within Yahoo!’s control for purposes of Rules 34 and 45. A subpoena seeking corporate documents directed to a corporation creates an obligation upon the corporation to produce the documents sought. Since Yahoo! is under an obligation to comply with the subpoena, the fact that no employee in the Chicago office has the ability to access the subpoenaed information does not deprive Yahoo! of the requisite control. See In re Jee, 104 B.R. 289, 294 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (rejecting objection to subpoena on ground that Los Angeles branch of non-party corporation lacked control over subpoenaed documents located in New York or Korea); Ghandi v. The Police Department of the City of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 122 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (stating “[i]t would torture the meaning of Rule 45 to hold that it requires the plaintiffs to serve upon the Bureau in every federal judicial district where the requested documents might be located a separate subpoena duces tecum for their production.”).

Ariel v. Jones, 693 F.2d 1058 (11th Cir. 1982), Echostar Communications Corp. v. News Corp. Ltd., 180 F.R.D. 391 (D. Colo. 1998), and Crafton v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co., 218 F.R.D. 175 (E.D. Ark. 2003), cited by Yahoo!, do not compel a different result. In contrast to the subpoenas in Ariel, Echostar, and Crafton, the subpoenas here were served directly on Yahoo!, not a third-party agent for service of process who did not control the requested documents. Ariel, Echostar, and Crafton do not hold that a corporation may only be subpoenaed in the district where the responsive documents are physically stored and accessible as Yahoo! argues.

Further, Laker Airways Limited v. Pan American World Airways, 607 F.Supp. 324 (S.D. N.Y. 1985), cited by Yahoo!, is not binding upon this Court. Laker and the cases it relied on are also quite dated and materially distinguishable from the present situation. Laker involved a potential collision between U.S. and foreign law. In Laker, the district court “vacated subpoenas that it viewed as a transparent effort to circumvent British laws proscribing disclosure of the bank records sought.” First American Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1998). Similarly, in Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960), the Second Circuit “deferred to a Canadian court for initial consideration of whether particular bank records were barred from disclosure under Canadian law, and held that it would allow the plaintiff to issue a subpoena in the future ‘[o]nly if, despite a ruling [by the Canadian courts] that production of the records or sending them outside the country would not be illegal, [there] were . . . a refusal to make such records available.” Id. at 21-22. First Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1959) also held that a court should not order production if the order would cause a party to violate foreign law. Here, there is no alleged conflict between production and foreign law or a risk that a U.S. court would infringe the right of a foreign court to interpret foreign law in the first instance. 
In Cates v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 480 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1973), also relied on by the Laker court, 
Navy regulations specified that the documents in question could be obtained only from the Secretary of the Navy in Washington, but a party attempted to obtain the documents by serving a subpoena on the commanding officers of a naval facility in Texas. The court held that the regulations could not be circumvented in this way. The critical factor in Cates was not the location of the documents but the location of the officer from whom they had to be sought.

Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 413 n.5. Unlike Cates, no controlling regulations are involved in the present case. Finally,in Elder-Beerman v. Federated Dep’t Stores, 45 F.R.D. 515 (S.D. N.Y. 1968), another case cited by the Laker court, the court quashed a subpoena issued by the Southern District of New York on a Georgia corporation’s only New York office. The court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction over a Georgia corporation because it failed to meet the minimum contacts test. Here, Yahoo! does not contest personal jurisdiction. In sum, each of the cases cited by Yahoo! and relied on by the Laker case cited by Yahoo! are factually distinguishable from the instant case and fall short of establishing that the subpoenas were improper because they sought production of documents in this district that are located and accessible in the Northern District of California.

Hon. Nan R. Nolan
United States Magistrate Judge
March 23, 2007

Tamburo v. Dworkin, Case no. 1:04-cv-03317-JBG-NRN, Doc. 250 (N.D.Ill. March 23, 2007)

Friday, August 30, 2013

An Interesting Tale

Braten and Soifer executed a sham document which they later claimed was a valid shareholders’ agreement. The document required BAC or Braten to lend Brookfield $250,000 by a specified date, in default of which BAC’s ownership of Brookfield would be transferred to Soifer. Soifer and Braten never intended that the loan be made, but expected that the bankruptcy court and BAC’s creditors, upon being shown the sham document and being informed that the condition had not been met, would believe that BAC no longer had any ownership interest in Brookfield. Braten and Soifer agreed that Soifer would hold Brookfield in a secret trust during the pendency of BAC’s Chapter 11 proceedings, and would return it only after BAC had achieved a substantial reduction in its debts through a confirmed reorganization plan.

After completing this fraudulent transfer, BAC filed a petition in bankruptcy on September 5, 1974. Rhoades acted as attorney for BAC and, along with Braten and Soifer, misrepresented to the court, to Bankers, and to other creditors that, because BAC had failed to issue the loan as required under the shareholders’ agreement, it no longer had any ownership interest in Brookfield.

Relying on these misrepresentations, Bankers agreed to, and the bankruptcy court confirmed, a plan of arrangement for BAC under which Bankers agreed to receive only 17.5% of its allowed claim. This plan relieved BAC of more than $4.3 million in debts, and permitted it to continue operating with Rhoades, Braten, and Soifer retaining control. Critical to Bankers’ acceptance of the plan was its belief that all BAC assets were being made available to the Chapter 11 proceeding. Had it known of the fraudulent transfer of Brookfield, Bankers never would have consented to the reorganization plan.

Shortly after confirmation of the plan and termination of the bankruptcy proceedings, Soifer, through a complicated series of transactions, returned ownership and control of Brookfield to BAC. At that time, Brookfield anticipated sales of $18 million in the coming year, had an annual net income in excess of $1.4 million, and had assets valued at well over $10 million.

In a further attempt to delay Bankers from collecting its debt, Rhoades, Braten and Soifer initiated frivolous lawsuits against Bankers in both New York and South Carolina state courts. In connection with the South Carolina action, in late 1978 Rhoades acquired, through a South Carolina corporation which he formed and which Soifer and Braten owned, a mortgage on which the judge presiding over the South Carolina action was personally obligated. Through an illegal agreement with the South Carolina judge, defendants then paid the judge’s debt as the mortgage installments came due. In return, the judge rendered two decisions favorable to BAC: on November 9, 1978, he denied Bankers’ motion to dismiss the action; and on January 18, 1979, he appointed a special referee who had ties to BAC and its counsel. These two bribed decisions caused Bankers to expend over $100,000 in legal fees.

In September 1976, upon learning of the transfer of Brookfield back to BAC, Bankers moved in the bankruptcy court to revoke BAC’s confirmation plan, alleging that it had been procured by fraud. The record is unclear as to why the bankruptcy court did not act on this motion immediately; but whatever the reason, in 1981-82, over five years after Bankers moved to revoke but while that motion was still pending, Rhoades, Braten and Soifer, in a continuing attempt to prevent Bankers and other creditors from collecting their debts, conspired to and did in fact fraudulently conceal and deplete BAC assets through a wide variety of methods, including fraudulent stock transfers, transfers of corporate assets to other companies and individuals without fair consideration, and transfers of monies in corporate accounts to satisfy defendants’ personal debts. Finally, on June 30, 1982, the bankruptcy court, holding that BAC had obtained its Chapter 11 reorganization by fraudulent means, revoked its confirmation plan and reinstated the bankruptcy proceedings. Those proceedings are still pending in the bankruptcy court.

Bankers commenced this action against defendants in the district court on August 24, 1982. It alleged that the continuing actions of Rhoades, Braten and Soifer — the common-law fraud and bankruptcy fraud in 1974-76, the frivolous lawsuits and bribery of the South Carolina judge in 1978-79, and the fraudulent conveyances in 1981-82 — constituted a “pattern of racketeering activity” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d).

Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F. 2d 1096, 1098-99 (2d Cir. 1988).

Sunday, July 21, 2013

Teachers Who Have Sex with Their Students

A lot of people know Defendant Salois as 'Ms. Salois, the English teacher.'

Or, you could say that a lot of people know Ms. Salois, the English teacher, as 'Defendant Salois.'

What is surprising though is how many teachers who have sex with their students happen to be female English teachers.

Kelly Ann Garcia - Houston, Tx. - English teacher

Kahtanna Culp - Houston, Tx

Debra Lafave - Florida - English teacher

Carrie McCandless - Colorado

Erin Thorne -

Katheryn Carmean - Delaware

Elyse Cromwell - New Jersey - English teacher

Leah Shipman - North Carolina

Kristine Ngum - North Carolina

Stephanie Fletcher - New York

Amanda Sotelo - Texas

Lynne Freeman - Colorado

Stefanie Dickinson - Colorado

Irene Khan -

Nicole Jacques - Pennsylvania

Stephanie Cobb -

Lauren Redfern - Colorado

Heather Whitten - Alabama

Andrea Ebert - Wisconsin

Jennifer Schultz - North Dakota

Kelly Miller - Aurora, Ill.

Pamela Rogers Turner - Tennessee

Amber Jennings - Massachusetts

Mary Kay Letourneau - Washington

Wendie Schweikert - South Carolina

Tara Driscoll - New York - English teacher

Rachel Holt -

Holly Hatcher - Tennessee

Angela Renee Comer - Kentucky

Brittni Colleps - Texas

Stacy Schuler - Ohio

Amie Neeley -

Jody Onorato - Orlando, Fla.

If you're wondering why Salois hasn't made that list, a lot of it has to do with the way that the State of Missouri actively encourages teacher-student sexual relations.

Another big part of it is that Salois was teaching at Southeast Missouri State University at the time she left her husband of ten years to pursue a "physical fling" with her student, ten years her junior.

And much like one of the North Carolina cases mentioned above, Salois (then Ms.Job) ran off to Maryland to marry her student.

But, knowing what I do about Cape Girardeau and the surrounding area, it isn't surprising that the university there is used by some primarily as a dating service for teachers to meet students.

The part that is surprising is that the President of the Board of Education of the St. Louis Public Schools would go so far out of her way to ensure that a known sexual predator would remain eligible for employment at SLPS.

But then, note that not one case from Missouri is mentioned in the above listing, and that this is not due to the lack of teacher-student sexual relations in that state.

Monday, June 17, 2013

The Fib

Remember Doc. 83-2 filed June 3, 2013?

Well, there was a bit of "intentional misinformation" in there.

That part about:
[H]e didn't just give me a written document to wave around in front of the court.
I didn't really mean that.

We're going to learn a little bit about electronic documents and such as we go along.

That little blue button up there with the "i" in it?

Well, where it says "encrypted search" right next to it means that a person logged in to a Google account performed a search.  It's not really "encrypted" per se.  In this instance, it means that the information is proprietary.

It means that somebody has better records than I do.

Though I would say that I have some pretty good records.

But we're going to learn a little bit more about that as we go along.

Monday, April 29, 2013

What St. Louis County Is REALLY All About . . .

A.    Preliminary Factual Contentions
1.      Complete Fictionalization of Events
Although Defendants’ Motion studiously avoids addressing any of the factual allegations stated in the pleadings; nonetheless, they manage to admit to a state-created danger, and a “special relationship” with the Firm in performance of a “public function” which is “required by statute,” and the attendant assumption of liability under Monell; as well as taking great pains to establish that Bealmear acted as a private citizen, i.e. a “volunteer,” and her liability as such in acts of extortion under color of official right pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1951, violent crime in aid of racketeering pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1959, conspiracy to launder money pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and various other racketeering predicate acts.
a.      Defendants’ Motion Refers to No Facts Stated in the Pleadings
The Statement of Facts in Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 46, I.) is a complete fictionalization, bearing not even a slight resemblance to reality.  Further, no documentation is attached to support the assertions made.  These unfounded assertions fail to refute the facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s verified Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) (“Complaint”).
b.      Facts Regarding the Orders of Protection
Among the numerous verifiable falsehoods stated in Defendants’ Motion is that:
Salois… applied for and was granted two orders of protection against Plaintiff in St. Louis County, Missouri from 2009-2010.
Doc. 46, I.  The majority of the order of protection activity was in St. Louis County; but there was only one granted to Salois, and the extension of it was denied.
A full accounting of each and every order of protection in chronological order here follows, each entered in St. Louis County, Missouri except where otherwise noted:
1.                  Hart v. Jinkerson, Cause no. 09SL-PN02411, on June 9, 2009; dismissed without prejudice on June 22, 2009;
2.                  Salois v. Hart, Cause no. 09SL-PN02974, on July 13, 2009; ex parte extended on July 30, 2009; directed to Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office for service on August 5, 2009; full order entered under duress following battery of Plaintiff on August 27, 2009; extension requested and denied on July 13, 2010; expired on August 26, 2010;
3.                  Straussner v. Hart, Cause no. 09SL-PN03697, on August 27, 2009; directed to Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office for service on August 27, 2009; full order entered on September 10, 2009; expired on September 9, 2010;
4.                  Hart v. Salois, Cause no. 09SL-PN03699, on August 27, 2009; full order entered on September 10, 2009; extended through November 4, 2010;
5.                  Hart v. Straussner, Cause no. 09SL-PN03700, on August 27, 2009; full order entered on September 10, 2009; rehearing and dismissal on November 23, 2009;
6.                  Milwaukee County, Wisconsin Harassment Restraining Order Hart v. Howard, Case No. 2009CV013711; ex parte denied August 31, 2009; Scott County, Missouri Sheriff’s Office unable to effect service; case dismissed;
7.                  Hart v. Salois, Cause no. 10SL-PN04549, on November 4, 2010; dismissed without prejudice by petitioner on November 18, 2010;
8.                  Platte County, Missouri order Hart v. Salois, Cause no. 10AE-CV04180, on November 18, 2010; full order entered on November 30, 2010; extended through December 20, 2011; extension denied.
Defendants’ Motion states:
Salois received Orders of Protection against Plaintiff in both Wisconsin and Missouri state courts.
Doc. 46, I, n. p.3.  Defendants’ Motion cites the Amended Complaint pp. 48-53, which states nothing of Salois’ acts; but rather the lawful subject matter jurisdiction for issuance of orders of protection and emergency orders in the States of Missouri and Wisconsin.  Rather, Salois’ relevant acts are described under the heading “The Original Petition” beginning at Compl. p. 57.  To Plaintiff’s knowledge, Salois entered into the State of Wisconsin only once as a small child.
The only relevant action in the circuit courts of the State of Wisconsin was the harassment civil injunction petition which Plaintiff filed against Defendant Douglas Howard.  This action was dismissed after the Scott County, Missouri Sheriff’s Office was unable to effect service on Defendant Howard, in many ways the quintessential meth addict, with a reputation for irritability and violence, and having an awful lot of spent shotgun shells littering his driveway.  It was the service of process in relation to this proceeding which:
Defendant Shirley Hopper inadvertently boasted of Defendant Howard’s capacity to evade service in her correspondence to the court in relation to the Platte County Order .
Compl. ¶541.
c.       Defendants’ Statement of Facts fail to state a valid legal defense
Defendants’ Statement of Facts, even if taken as true, fails to state a valid legal defense; instead stating that it is the official policy, custom, practice, and procedure that certain persons, of which class Plaintiff was a member, should properly be subjected to felony crimes, including but not limited to crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16, solely on the basis of perceived thought, feeling, opinion, and belief.
2.      Defendants’ Motion a Press Release for the Firm
That the County has no concern for representing the interests of the Officers in favor of protecting their free source of labor in the Firm is readily apparent, in that Defendants’ Motion reads very much like a press release for the Firm.
Defendants’ Motion, rather than addressing the allegations of fact stated in the Complaint, certifies that the following is true and correct after a reasonable inquiry, and may be supported by admissible evidence, although no manner of documentation is submitted in support:
1.                  “[T]he present action was commenced in bad faith”;
2.                  “[T]he present action… is alarming evidence of a pattern of pathological conduct”;
3.                  “[T]he sole motive [of the instant matter] [is] to assert power and control over Defendant Sherry Ann Salois”;
4.                  “Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is nothing more than a … retaliatory instrument against Defendant Sherry Ann Salois”;
5.                  That “[Plaintiff] continues to perpetuate” “domestic conflict” “through the present action.”
That these characterizations are not substantiated by documentation, but rather this Court is asked to assume the truth of all factual allegations stated in the Complaint, drawing reasonable inferences therefrom, the following deconstruction provides more clarity as to what these assertions actually entail:
1.                  Any person the victim of fraud or violent crime, being deprived of rights secured by the United States Constitution and its laws, who might seek redress or vindication must necessarily act “in bad faith”;
2.                  To seek vindication of rights or redress of grievances in a federal court constitutes “evidence of a pattern of pathological conduct”;
3.                  That for any person to seek vindication of rights or redress of grievances in a federal court amounts to “pathological conduct” to “assert power and control” over parties culpable by law;
4.                  That for any person to seek vindication of rights or redress of grievances in a federal court is merely “retaliatory”;
5.                  That “power and control over Defendant Sherry Ann Salois” is somehow desired by Plaintiff for no apparent reason, and the instant matter has been reasonably determined to constitute effective means;
6.                  That schemes of bankruptcy fraud, identity fraud, extortion, wire fraud, and deprivation of civil rights amount to a “domestic conflict” under the laws of the United States;
7.                  That Plaintiff initiated and “continues to perpetuate” schemes of bankruptcy fraud, identity fraud, extortion, wire fraud, and deprivation of civil rights upon himself;
8.                  That, while “presenting to the court a… written motion” such a paper as Defendant’s Motion, “with the apparent purpose, or at least the effect, of harassment, not only of [the] opposing part[y] but of the judicial machinery itself[,]… barely discernible,… replete with conclusory and self-serving allegations… contain[ing] numerous frivolous claims under a nonsensical laundry list of authorities” that to respond to the allegations of fact stated in the Complaint in such a manner is “after an inquiry reasonable” is “certifie[d] that”: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose… ; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law… ; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support… ; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence[.]  Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b); Doc. 41, I. ¶1.
Defendants’ Motion cites no supporting law favoring these assertions.
3.      Crimes of Violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16 which
Defendants State Any Person Is Rightfully Subjected to
on the Sole Basis of Thought, Feeling, Opinion, or Belief
In perfect keeping with the long and checkered history of the Ku Klux Klan in St. Louis County, Missouri, Defendants’ Motion states unequivocally that it is the official policy, custom, practice, and procedure of Defendant St. Louis County that Plaintiff be subjected to felony crimes, including but not limited to crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16, solely on the basis of his perceived thoughts, feelings, opinions, and beliefs; without regard to the veracity of such perception.
For present considerations, it is unimportant as to whether these Defendants are actually officially affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan, or merely that the attitudes, traditions, and customs of that organization are so deeply embedded within the culture of that place that these Defendants’ goals and aims have evolved wholly independently along parallel lines so as to arrive at precisely the same ends.  Nonetheless, the fact that the Ku Klux Klan remains active in St. Louis County, Missouri offers important insight and guidance on this point.
A partial listing of the felony crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16 which Defendants state that Plaintiff, among other persons, is properly subjected to on the sole basis of thought, feeling, opinion, and belief is here attached as Exhibit 6.  Exh. 6.

Monday, April 22, 2013

The County or the Klan?

b.      Defendants’ Motion Refers to No Facts Stated in the Pleadings
In addition to the wholesale fabrication of events, Defendants’ Motion studiously avoids addressing any of the factual allegations stated in the pleadings; nonetheless, they manage to admit to a state-created danger, and a “special relationship” with the Firm in performance of a “public function” which is “required by statute,” and the attendant assumption of liability under Monell; as well as establishing Bealmear’s liability in the racketeering predicate acts of extortion under color of official right pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and violent crime in aid of racketeering pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1959.

Thursday, April 11, 2013

The Charitable Purpose of Legal Advocates for Abused Women

Further, to accept these Defendants’ arguments as true, the Court must necessarily also accept that:
1.      Defendant Timothy Straussner is a woman;
2.      To publish the words of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. constitutes a “crime of violence” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16;
3.      Although were Plaintiff to launch an Atlas V missile from Milwaukee, Wisconsin directly at Salois in St. Louis, Missouri, and she would still have time to seek shelter or otherwise avoid such missile strike, that Plaintiff battered Salois in her person from such a distance;
4.      The illegal song is a “crime of violence” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16, constituting a “true threat” pursuant to Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003), on the grounds that pop/punk might cause Salois to harm herself or her children, when in fact the reading of any Bible verse or a paragraph from The Catcher in the Rye might well incline Salois to such acts; although it remains undetermined as to which Bible verses are illegal in the State of Missouri, as well as the extent this proposed “Catcher in the Rye defense” will revolutionize the work of criminal defense attorneys in that state;
5.      To provide disguises to persons committing assault and battery for the purpose of forwarding a claim of mistaken identity in a court of law constitutes a “charitable purpose” under the Second Restatement of Trusts;
6.      To corruptly influence the due course of justice in a pending federal judicial proceeding constitutes a “charitable purpose” under the Second Restatement of Trusts;
7.      Although Defendants substantiate each element of a claim for six racketeering counts in their Motion, they are nonetheless without liability in their participation in the operation and management of a multi-state racketeering enterprise; and
8.      Numerous other such nonsensical assertions which boggle the mind in their stupidity.

Wednesday, March 6, 2013

Some People Don't Get It

When you have people who are being charged in a federal court for conspiring to corruptly endeavor to "influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice"-- a felony offense under the federal code, punishable by up to ten years confinement-- yet still, I see things like this:

Rather than answering a complaint.

Even after I posted the notices below.

I, myself, have seen some of these discovery sanctions that the federal courts impose on violators; one man even having been jailed for two years.

I have seen that often the sanctions for discovery violations will run at 125% of the award at suit.

I have no reasonable explanation for such continued behavior.

But I do believe that I have sufficient evidence for a showing of bad faith on the part of the discovery violators.

The one decision that comes to mind states:
Bad faith is the anti-thesis of good faith.
And it goes on from there.

Monday, March 4, 2013

I left these posts up, to avoid the appearance of wrong-doing in pending litigation; specifically, to avoid sanctions imposed by the court due to discovery abuses.

After numerous complaints to opposing counsel regarding unauthorized discovery, and after affecting my first notice of such abuses to the court, I decided enough is enough.

Having previously posted sufficient notice concerning the timing of lawful discovery, it is surprising to me that certain persons continue to take part in such activities.

If you are a party in pending litigation, and there is something that you really need to see here, you can pursue the normal discovery channels following the conference.

This site was instituted for the benefit of print journalists.  If you are not a print journalist, you have no business here.

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Maybe We're Not so Sure about Rule 26


I sure hope these people aren't trying to engage in discovery before a pre-trial conference.

Because I don't think my magistrate is going to like that too well.

To my knowledge, the federal rules permit discovery after the answer.

Just sayin'.


Here's this little excerpt from the current motion that I'm working on:
Rule 26(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f),” unless “authorized under these rules or by order or agreement of the parties.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d).