/* The Malfeasance of St. Louis County: April 2013 */

Monday, April 29, 2013

What St. Louis County Is REALLY All About . . .


A.    Preliminary Factual Contentions
1.      Complete Fictionalization of Events
Although Defendants’ Motion studiously avoids addressing any of the factual allegations stated in the pleadings; nonetheless, they manage to admit to a state-created danger, and a “special relationship” with the Firm in performance of a “public function” which is “required by statute,” and the attendant assumption of liability under Monell; as well as taking great pains to establish that Bealmear acted as a private citizen, i.e. a “volunteer,” and her liability as such in acts of extortion under color of official right pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1951, violent crime in aid of racketeering pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1959, conspiracy to launder money pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and various other racketeering predicate acts.
a.      Defendants’ Motion Refers to No Facts Stated in the Pleadings
The Statement of Facts in Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 46, I.) is a complete fictionalization, bearing not even a slight resemblance to reality.  Further, no documentation is attached to support the assertions made.  These unfounded assertions fail to refute the facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s verified Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) (“Complaint”).
b.      Facts Regarding the Orders of Protection
Among the numerous verifiable falsehoods stated in Defendants’ Motion is that:
Salois… applied for and was granted two orders of protection against Plaintiff in St. Louis County, Missouri from 2009-2010.
Doc. 46, I.  The majority of the order of protection activity was in St. Louis County; but there was only one granted to Salois, and the extension of it was denied.
A full accounting of each and every order of protection in chronological order here follows, each entered in St. Louis County, Missouri except where otherwise noted:
1.                  Hart v. Jinkerson, Cause no. 09SL-PN02411, on June 9, 2009; dismissed without prejudice on June 22, 2009;
2.                  Salois v. Hart, Cause no. 09SL-PN02974, on July 13, 2009; ex parte extended on July 30, 2009; directed to Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office for service on August 5, 2009; full order entered under duress following battery of Plaintiff on August 27, 2009; extension requested and denied on July 13, 2010; expired on August 26, 2010;
3.                  Straussner v. Hart, Cause no. 09SL-PN03697, on August 27, 2009; directed to Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office for service on August 27, 2009; full order entered on September 10, 2009; expired on September 9, 2010;
4.                  Hart v. Salois, Cause no. 09SL-PN03699, on August 27, 2009; full order entered on September 10, 2009; extended through November 4, 2010;
5.                  Hart v. Straussner, Cause no. 09SL-PN03700, on August 27, 2009; full order entered on September 10, 2009; rehearing and dismissal on November 23, 2009;
6.                  Milwaukee County, Wisconsin Harassment Restraining Order Hart v. Howard, Case No. 2009CV013711; ex parte denied August 31, 2009; Scott County, Missouri Sheriff’s Office unable to effect service; case dismissed;
7.                  Hart v. Salois, Cause no. 10SL-PN04549, on November 4, 2010; dismissed without prejudice by petitioner on November 18, 2010;
8.                  Platte County, Missouri order Hart v. Salois, Cause no. 10AE-CV04180, on November 18, 2010; full order entered on November 30, 2010; extended through December 20, 2011; extension denied.
Defendants’ Motion states:
Salois received Orders of Protection against Plaintiff in both Wisconsin and Missouri state courts.
Doc. 46, I, n. p.3.  Defendants’ Motion cites the Amended Complaint pp. 48-53, which states nothing of Salois’ acts; but rather the lawful subject matter jurisdiction for issuance of orders of protection and emergency orders in the States of Missouri and Wisconsin.  Rather, Salois’ relevant acts are described under the heading “The Original Petition” beginning at Compl. p. 57.  To Plaintiff’s knowledge, Salois entered into the State of Wisconsin only once as a small child.
The only relevant action in the circuit courts of the State of Wisconsin was the harassment civil injunction petition which Plaintiff filed against Defendant Douglas Howard.  This action was dismissed after the Scott County, Missouri Sheriff’s Office was unable to effect service on Defendant Howard, in many ways the quintessential meth addict, with a reputation for irritability and violence, and having an awful lot of spent shotgun shells littering his driveway.  It was the service of process in relation to this proceeding which:
Defendant Shirley Hopper inadvertently boasted of Defendant Howard’s capacity to evade service in her correspondence to the court in relation to the Platte County Order .
Compl. ¶541.
c.       Defendants’ Statement of Facts fail to state a valid legal defense
Defendants’ Statement of Facts, even if taken as true, fails to state a valid legal defense; instead stating that it is the official policy, custom, practice, and procedure that certain persons, of which class Plaintiff was a member, should properly be subjected to felony crimes, including but not limited to crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16, solely on the basis of perceived thought, feeling, opinion, and belief.
2.      Defendants’ Motion a Press Release for the Firm
That the County has no concern for representing the interests of the Officers in favor of protecting their free source of labor in the Firm is readily apparent, in that Defendants’ Motion reads very much like a press release for the Firm.
Defendants’ Motion, rather than addressing the allegations of fact stated in the Complaint, certifies that the following is true and correct after a reasonable inquiry, and may be supported by admissible evidence, although no manner of documentation is submitted in support:
1.                  “[T]he present action was commenced in bad faith”;
2.                  “[T]he present action… is alarming evidence of a pattern of pathological conduct”;
3.                  “[T]he sole motive [of the instant matter] [is] to assert power and control over Defendant Sherry Ann Salois”;
4.                  “Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is nothing more than a … retaliatory instrument against Defendant Sherry Ann Salois”;
5.                  That “[Plaintiff] continues to perpetuate” “domestic conflict” “through the present action.”
That these characterizations are not substantiated by documentation, but rather this Court is asked to assume the truth of all factual allegations stated in the Complaint, drawing reasonable inferences therefrom, the following deconstruction provides more clarity as to what these assertions actually entail:
1.                  Any person the victim of fraud or violent crime, being deprived of rights secured by the United States Constitution and its laws, who might seek redress or vindication must necessarily act “in bad faith”;
2.                  To seek vindication of rights or redress of grievances in a federal court constitutes “evidence of a pattern of pathological conduct”;
3.                  That for any person to seek vindication of rights or redress of grievances in a federal court amounts to “pathological conduct” to “assert power and control” over parties culpable by law;
4.                  That for any person to seek vindication of rights or redress of grievances in a federal court is merely “retaliatory”;
5.                  That “power and control over Defendant Sherry Ann Salois” is somehow desired by Plaintiff for no apparent reason, and the instant matter has been reasonably determined to constitute effective means;
6.                  That schemes of bankruptcy fraud, identity fraud, extortion, wire fraud, and deprivation of civil rights amount to a “domestic conflict” under the laws of the United States;
7.                  That Plaintiff initiated and “continues to perpetuate” schemes of bankruptcy fraud, identity fraud, extortion, wire fraud, and deprivation of civil rights upon himself;
8.                  That, while “presenting to the court a… written motion” such a paper as Defendant’s Motion, “with the apparent purpose, or at least the effect, of harassment, not only of [the] opposing part[y] but of the judicial machinery itself[,]… barely discernible,… replete with conclusory and self-serving allegations… contain[ing] numerous frivolous claims under a nonsensical laundry list of authorities” that to respond to the allegations of fact stated in the Complaint in such a manner is “after an inquiry reasonable” is “certifie[d] that”: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose… ; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law… ; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support… ; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence[.]  Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b); Doc. 41, I. ¶1.
Defendants’ Motion cites no supporting law favoring these assertions.
3.      Crimes of Violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16 which
Defendants State Any Person Is Rightfully Subjected to
on the Sole Basis of Thought, Feeling, Opinion, or Belief
In perfect keeping with the long and checkered history of the Ku Klux Klan in St. Louis County, Missouri, Defendants’ Motion states unequivocally that it is the official policy, custom, practice, and procedure of Defendant St. Louis County that Plaintiff be subjected to felony crimes, including but not limited to crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16, solely on the basis of his perceived thoughts, feelings, opinions, and beliefs; without regard to the veracity of such perception.
For present considerations, it is unimportant as to whether these Defendants are actually officially affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan, or merely that the attitudes, traditions, and customs of that organization are so deeply embedded within the culture of that place that these Defendants’ goals and aims have evolved wholly independently along parallel lines so as to arrive at precisely the same ends.  Nonetheless, the fact that the Ku Klux Klan remains active in St. Louis County, Missouri offers important insight and guidance on this point.
A partial listing of the felony crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16 which Defendants state that Plaintiff, among other persons, is properly subjected to on the sole basis of thought, feeling, opinion, and belief is here attached as Exhibit 6.  Exh. 6.



Monday, April 22, 2013

The County or the Klan?


b.      Defendants’ Motion Refers to No Facts Stated in the Pleadings
In addition to the wholesale fabrication of events, Defendants’ Motion studiously avoids addressing any of the factual allegations stated in the pleadings; nonetheless, they manage to admit to a state-created danger, and a “special relationship” with the Firm in performance of a “public function” which is “required by statute,” and the attendant assumption of liability under Monell; as well as establishing Bealmear’s liability in the racketeering predicate acts of extortion under color of official right pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and violent crime in aid of racketeering pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1959.

Thursday, April 11, 2013

The Charitable Purpose of Legal Advocates for Abused Women


Further, to accept these Defendants’ arguments as true, the Court must necessarily also accept that:
1.      Defendant Timothy Straussner is a woman;
2.      To publish the words of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. constitutes a “crime of violence” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16;
3.      Although were Plaintiff to launch an Atlas V missile from Milwaukee, Wisconsin directly at Salois in St. Louis, Missouri, and she would still have time to seek shelter or otherwise avoid such missile strike, that Plaintiff battered Salois in her person from such a distance;
4.      The illegal song is a “crime of violence” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16, constituting a “true threat” pursuant to Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003), on the grounds that pop/punk might cause Salois to harm herself or her children, when in fact the reading of any Bible verse or a paragraph from The Catcher in the Rye might well incline Salois to such acts; although it remains undetermined as to which Bible verses are illegal in the State of Missouri, as well as the extent this proposed “Catcher in the Rye defense” will revolutionize the work of criminal defense attorneys in that state;
5.      To provide disguises to persons committing assault and battery for the purpose of forwarding a claim of mistaken identity in a court of law constitutes a “charitable purpose” under the Second Restatement of Trusts;
6.      To corruptly influence the due course of justice in a pending federal judicial proceeding constitutes a “charitable purpose” under the Second Restatement of Trusts;
7.      Although Defendants substantiate each element of a claim for six racketeering counts in their Motion, they are nonetheless without liability in their participation in the operation and management of a multi-state racketeering enterprise; and
8.      Numerous other such nonsensical assertions which boggle the mind in their stupidity.