Teachers Who Have Sex with Their Students

A lot of people know Defendant Salois as 'Ms. Salois, the English teacher.'

Or, you could say that a lot of people know Ms. Salois, the English teacher, as 'Defendant Salois.'

What is surprising though is how many teachers who have sex with their students happen to be female English teachers.

Kelly Ann Garcia - Houston, Tx. - English teacher

Kahtanna Culp - Houston, Tx

Debra Lafave - Florida - English teacher

Carrie McCandless - Colorado

Erin Thorne -

Katheryn Carmean - Delaware

Elyse Cromwell - New Jersey - English teacher

Leah Shipman - North Carolina

Kristine Ngum - North Carolina

Stephanie Fletcher - New York

Amanda Sotelo - Texas

Lynne Freeman - Colorado

Stefanie Dickinson - Colorado

Irene Khan -

Nicole Jacques - Pennsylvania

Stephanie Cobb -

Lauren Redfern - Colorado

Heather Whitten - Alabama

Andrea Ebert - Wisconsin

Jennifer Schultz - North Dakota

Kelly Miller - Aurora, Ill.

Pamela Rogers Turner - Tennessee

Amber Jennings - Massachusetts

Mary Kay Letourneau - Washington

Wendie Schweikert - South Carolina

Tara Driscoll - New York - English teacher

Rachel Holt -

Holly Hatcher - Tennessee

Angela Renee Comer - Kentucky

Brittni Colleps - Texas

Stacy Schuler - Ohio

Amie Neeley -

Jody Onorato - Orlando, Fla.

If you're wondering why Salois hasn't made that list, a lot of it has to do with the way that the State of Missouri actively encourages teacher-student sexual relations.

Another big part of it is that Salois was teaching at Southeast Missouri State University at the time she left her husband of ten years to pursue a "physical fling" with her student, ten years her junior.

And much like one of the North Carolina cases mentioned above, Salois (then Ms.Job) ran off to Maryland to marry her student.

But, knowing what I do about Cape Girardeau and the surrounding area, it isn't surprising that the university there is used by some primarily as a dating service for teachers to meet students.

The part that is surprising is that the President of the Board of Education of the St. Louis Public Schools would go so far out of her way to ensure that a known sexual predator would remain eligible for employment at SLPS.

But then, note that not one case from Missouri is mentioned in the above listing, and that this is not due to the lack of teacher-student sexual relations in that state.

The Fib

Remember Doc. 83-2 filed June 3, 2013?

Well, there was a bit of "intentional misinformation" in there.

That part about:

[H]e didn't just give me a written document to wave around in front of the court.

I didn't really mean that.

We're going to learn a little bit about electronic documents and such as we go along.

That little blue button up there with the "i" in it?

Well, where it says "encrypted search" right next to it means that a person logged in to a Google account performed a search.  It's not really "encrypted" per se.  In this instance, it means that the information is proprietary.

It means that somebody has better records than I do.

Though I would say that I have some pretty good records.

But we're going to learn a little bit more about that as we go along.

What St. Louis County Is REALLY All About . . .

A.    Preliminary Factual Contentions

1.      Complete Fictionalization of Events

Although Defendants’ Motion studiously avoids addressing any of the factual allegations stated in the pleadings; nonetheless, they manage to admit to a state-created danger, and a “special relationship” with the Firm in performance of a “public function” which is “required by statute,” and the attendant assumption of liability under Monell; as well as taking great pains to establish that Bealmear acted as a private citizen, i.e. a “volunteer,” and her liability as such in acts of extortion under color of official right pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1951, violent crime in aid of racketeering pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1959, conspiracy to launder money pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and various other racketeering predicate acts.

a.      Defendants’ Motion Refers to No Facts Stated in the Pleadings

The Statement of Facts in Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 46, I.) is a complete fictionalization, bearing not even a slight resemblance to reality.  Further, no documentation is attached to support the assertions made.  These unfounded assertions fail to refute the facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s verified Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) (“Complaint”).

b.      Facts Regarding the Orders of Protection

Among the numerous verifiable falsehoods stated in Defendants’ Motion is that:

Salois… applied for and was granted two orders of protection against Plaintiff in St. Louis County, Missouri from 2009-2010.

Doc. 46, I.  The majority of the order of protection activity was in St. Louis County; but there was only one granted to Salois, and the extension of it was denied.

A full accounting of each and every order of protection in chronological order here follows, each entered in St. Louis County, Missouri except where otherwise noted:

1.                  Hart v. Jinkerson, Cause no. 09SL-PN02411, on June 9, 2009; dismissed without prejudice on June 22, 2009;

2.                  Salois v. Hart, Cause no. 09SL-PN02974, on July 13, 2009; ex parte extended on July 30, 2009; directed to Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office for service on August 5, 2009; full order entered under duress following battery of Plaintiff on August 27, 2009; extension requested and denied on July 13, 2010; expired on August 26, 2010;

3.                  Straussner v. Hart, Cause no. 09SL-PN03697, on August 27, 2009; directed to Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office for service on August 27, 2009; full order entered on September 10, 2009; expired on September 9, 2010;

4.                  Hart v. Salois, Cause no. 09SL-PN03699, on August 27, 2009; full order entered on September 10, 2009; extended through November 4, 2010;

5.                  Hart v. Straussner, Cause no. 09SL-PN03700, on August 27, 2009; full order entered on September 10, 2009; rehearing and dismissal on November 23, 2009;

6.                  Milwaukee County, Wisconsin Harassment Restraining Order Hart v. Howard, Case No. 2009CV013711; ex parte denied August 31, 2009; Scott County, Missouri Sheriff’s Office unable to effect service; case dismissed;

7.                  Hart v. Salois, Cause no. 10SL-PN04549, on November 4, 2010; dismissed without prejudice by petitioner on November 18, 2010;

8.                  Platte County, Missouri order Hart v. Salois, Cause no. 10AE-CV04180, on November 18, 2010; full order entered on November 30, 2010; extended through December 20, 2011; extension denied.

Defendants’ Motion states:

Salois received Orders of Protection against Plaintiff in both Wisconsin and Missouri state courts.

Doc. 46, I, n. p.3.  Defendants’ Motion cites the Amended Complaint pp. 48-53, which states nothing of Salois’ acts; but rather the lawful subject matter jurisdiction for issuance of orders of protection and emergency orders in the States of Missouri and Wisconsin.  Rather, Salois’ relevant acts are described under the heading “The Original Petition” beginning at Compl. p. 57.  To Plaintiff’s knowledge, Salois entered into the State of Wisconsin only once as a small child.

The only relevant action in the circuit courts of the State of Wisconsin was the harassment civil injunction petition which Plaintiff filed against Defendant Douglas Howard.  This action was dismissed after the Scott County, Missouri Sheriff’s Office was unable to effect service on Defendant Howard, in many ways the quintessential meth addict, with a reputation for irritability and violence, and having an awful lot of spent shotgun shells littering his driveway.  It was the service of process in relation to this proceeding which:

Defendant Shirley Hopper inadvertently boasted of Defendant Howard’s capacity to evade service in her correspondence to the court in relation to the Platte County Order .

Compl. ¶541.

c.       Defendants’ Statement of Facts fail to state a valid legal defense

Defendants’ Statement of Facts, even if taken as true, fails to state a valid legal defense; instead stating that it is the official policy, custom, practice, and procedure that certain persons, of which class Plaintiff was a member, should properly be subjected to felony crimes, including but not limited to crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16, solely on the basis of perceived thought, feeling, opinion, and belief.

2.      Defendants’ Motion a Press Release for the Firm

That the County has no concern for representing the interests of the Officers in favor of protecting their free source of labor in the Firm is readily apparent, in that Defendants’ Motion reads very much like a press release for the Firm.

Defendants’ Motion, rather than addressing the allegations of fact stated in the Complaint, certifies that the following is true and correct after a reasonable inquiry, and may be supported by admissible evidence, although no manner of documentation is submitted in support:

1.                  “[T]he present action was commenced in bad faith”;

2.                  “[T]he present action… is alarming evidence of a pattern of pathological conduct”;

3.                  “[T]he sole motive [of the instant matter] [is] to assert power and control over Defendant Sherry Ann Salois”;

4.                  “Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is nothing more than a … retaliatory instrument against Defendant Sherry Ann Salois”;

5.                  That “[Plaintiff] continues to perpetuate” “domestic conflict” “through the present action.”

That these characterizations are not substantiated by documentation, but rather this Court is asked to assume the truth of all factual allegations stated in the Complaint, drawing reasonable inferences therefrom, the following deconstruction provides more clarity as to what these assertions actually entail:

1.                  Any person the victim of fraud or violent crime, being deprived of rights secured by the United States Constitution and its laws, who might seek redress or vindication must necessarily act “in bad faith”;

2.                  To seek vindication of rights or redress of grievances in a federal court constitutes “evidence of a pattern of pathological conduct”;

3.                  That for any person to seek vindication of rights or redress of grievances in a federal court amounts to “pathological conduct” to “assert power and control” over parties culpable by law;

4.                  That for any person to seek vindication of rights or redress of grievances in a federal court is merely “retaliatory”;

5.                  That “power and control over Defendant Sherry Ann Salois” is somehow desired by Plaintiff for no apparent reason, and the instant matter has been reasonably determined to constitute effective means;

6.                  That schemes of bankruptcy fraud, identity fraud, extortion, wire fraud, and deprivation of civil rights amount to a “domestic conflict” under the laws of the United States;

7.                  That Plaintiff initiated and “continues to perpetuate” schemes of bankruptcy fraud, identity fraud, extortion, wire fraud, and deprivation of civil rights upon himself;

8.                  That, while “presenting to the court a… written motion” such a paper as Defendant’s Motion, “with the apparent purpose, or at least the effect, of harassment, not only of [the] opposing part[y] but of the judicial machinery itself[,]… barely discernible,… replete with conclusory and self-serving allegations… contain[ing] numerous frivolous claims under a nonsensical laundry list of authorities” that to respond to the allegations of fact stated in the Complaint in such a manner is “after an inquiry reasonable” is “certifie[d] that”: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose… ; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law… ; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support… ; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence[.]  Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b); Doc. 41, I. ¶1.

Defendants’ Motion cites no supporting law favoring these assertions.

3.      Crimes of Violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16 which

Defendants State Any Person Is Rightfully Subjected to

on the Sole Basis of Thought, Feeling, Opinion, or Belief

In perfect keeping with the long and checkered history of the Ku Klux Klan in St. Louis County, Missouri, Defendants’ Motion states unequivocally that it is the official policy, custom, practice, and procedure of Defendant St. Louis County that Plaintiff be subjected to felony crimes, including but not limited to crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16, solely on the basis of his perceived thoughts, feelings, opinions, and beliefs; without regard to the veracity of such perception.

For present considerations, it is unimportant as to whether these Defendants are actually officially affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan, or merely that the attitudes, traditions, and customs of that organization are so deeply embedded within the culture of that place that these Defendants’ goals and aims have evolved wholly independently along parallel lines so as to arrive at precisely the same ends.  Nonetheless, the fact that the Ku Klux Klan remains active in St. Louis County, Missouri offers important insight and guidance on this point.

A partial listing of the felony crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16 which Defendants state that Plaintiff, among other persons, is properly subjected to on the sole basis of thought, feeling, opinion, and belief is here attached as Exhibit 6.  Exh. 6.